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Regulating Laboratory-Developed Tests
Timothy J. O’Leary, M.D., Ph.D.From the Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, District of Columbia (Editor-in-Chief)Disclaimer: The views expressed in this editorial are solely those of the
author and should not be construed as reﬂecting the views of the Department
of Veterans Affairs or the United States Government.As a molecular pathologist for more than 20 years, I have had
the opportunity to develop laboratory tests and to assess the
efforts of others to develop laboratory tests. As Editor of The
Journal of Molecular Diagnostics for 5 years, I have had
the privilege and responsibility to review a wider range of
developments by laboratories and manufacturers alike. In my
work with the US government, including two stints at the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), I’ve been witness to the
means by which laboratories and manufacturers alike draw
conclusions from their data. After all of this, I cannot conclude
that either laboratories or manufacturers invariably report
conclusions that are supported by their data using statistically
valid techniques based on unbiased and appropriate experi-
mental design. I’ve also come to recognize that regulatory ac-
tivities often fail to accurately and effectively identify important
systemic problems and that lack of adequate coordination
among agencies creates confusion, increases burden on the
general public, may increase the costs of providing medical
services (thus increasing taxpayer burden), and has the poten-
tial of paradoxically and negatively inﬂuencing public health
outcomes. In light of my personal experience, this Editorial
discusses some of the issues raised by the FDA’s proposed
framework for regulating laboratory developed tests (LDTs).
The FDA Weighs in on LDTs
The FDA recently notiﬁed the US Congress of its intent
to establish a Framework for Oversight of Laboratory
Developed Tests including a description of the Anticipated
Details of that the proposed framework (http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/
InVitroDiagnostics/UCM407409.pdf, published online July
31, 2014). The agency suggests that increased oversight is
appropriate as LDTs are highly complex, manufactured in high
volume, used to screen for common diseases, used to direct
critical treatment decisions, and are distributed widely, among
other reasons. The FDA asserts that the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments (CLIA)1 and their implementingCopyright ª 2014 American Society for Investigative Pathology
and the Association for Molecular Pathology.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoldx.2014.09.002regulations do not provide for premarket review, ensure clinical
validity, or provide for removal of unsafe LDTs from the
market. Speciﬁcally, the FDA argues that CLIA fails to provide
assurance that LDT test results are safe and effective. The FDA
further emphasizes that “LDTs that have not been properly
clinically validated for their intended use and are used to
make critical clinical decisions potentially put patients at risk
of missed or incorrect diagnosis, failure to administer appro-
priate treatment or administration of potentially harmful treat-
ment with no beneﬁt” (http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Medical
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/
UCM407409.pdf, last accessed September 26, 2014). To
address these perceived deﬁciencies, the FDA announce-
ment proposes to require that laboratories provide the
agency information about LDTs that are currently on the
market and to notify the FDA of any new LDTs or signiﬁ-
cantly modiﬁed LDTs before clinical use. The agency then
intends to begin premarket review of LDTs using a risk-
based approach that relies in part on the participation of
expert advisory panels. The FDA would focus its initial
review on LDTs with the same intended uses as existing
FDA-approved Class III medical devices. Signiﬁcantly, the
FDA will maintain a signiﬁcant focus on LDTs used in
direct-to-consumer testing.
Reactions to the FDA’s notice have been mixed. For
example, the Association for Molecular Pathology (which co-
owns the JMD) has reafﬁrmed its position that federal regula-
tory oversight for most LDTs should remainwithCLIA, which
could be improved (http://amp.org/documents/AMPResponds
toFDADraftProposedLDTRegulation_07.31.14_FINAL.pdf,
last accessed September 26, 2014). The Advanced Medical
Technology Association Diagnostics, on the other hand,
strongly supports more aggressive FDA action (http://
advamed.org/news/117/advameddx-commends-fdas-issuance-
of-ldt-draft-framework, last accessed September 26, 2014).
O’LearyFor the reasons outlined below, I remain cautious of the pro-
posed guidance by the FDA on LDTs, just as I remain skeptical
of the belief that the CLIA framework, as currently imple-
mented, provides adequate oversight in a world in which mo-
lecular analysis and the uses to which they are put are radically
different from when the CLIA regulations were ﬁrst
promulgated.
The Regulatory Legal Landscape
At least one policy structure to consider when evaluating the
FDA’s proposed framework is in President Obama’s 2011
Executive Order 13563,2 which provides that
“each agency must, among other things: i) propose or adopt a
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its beneﬁts
justify its costs (recognizing that some beneﬁts and costs are
difﬁcult to quantify); ii) tailor its regulations to impose the least
burden on society, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives,
taking into account, among other things, and to the extent practi-
cable, the costs of cumulative regulations; iii) select, in choosing
among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that
maximize net beneﬁts (including potential economic, environ-
mental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive
impacts; and equity); iv) to the extent feasible, specify performance
objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of
compliance that regulated entities must adopt; and v) identify and
assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including
providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior,
such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information
upon which choices can be made by the public.”p3821e3823
This order suggests that when deciding to undertake a
regulatory change (whether through rulemaking or guidance),
regulatory agencies should i) be able to clearly deﬁne the
problem to be solved through regulatory action, ii) be able to
quantitatively assess the problem, iii) be able to show that the
proposed regulatory action will effectively address the
problem, and iv) demonstrate that the regulatory burden is
appropriate to the societal costs imposed by the problem. The
reason for taking this measured and disciplined approach for
LDTs is simple: regulatory activities should not impose an
opportunity cost that can impair public health by denying
patients medical innovations, particularly when new regula-
tory burden is substantially disproportionate to the public
health deﬁciency that inspired it.
Balancing Risk with Reward
It’s true that there exist LDTs that are inappropriately vali-
dated. However, although LDTs have been blamed for
adverse patient outcomes,3,4 most of the reports cannot be
considered high-quality scientiﬁc evidence. The widely cited
warning letter sent by FDA to 23andMe, Inc. (http://www.
fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2013/ucm3
76296.htm, last accessed September 26, 2014), perhaps the
most widely publicized LDT enforcement action attempted
by the agency, cites no evidence of any harm to any patient.596However, it’s clear that that direct-to-consumer testing
companies have reported disease risk proﬁles without
adequate validation.3 Authors of papers submitted to JMD and
other journals have at times drawn conclusions that were not
supported by their data, lending legitimacy to concerns about
some LDTs. In one highly publicized case, staff at a highly
regarded academicmedical center developed anLDT that they
used in clinical trials, and as a result of an error in test devel-
opment, the test did not do what it was purported to do.5e11
Additionally, the way in which LDTs are marketed has
changed. Individual laboratories once collaborated with and
developed tests for local clinicians. Now laboratory testing
companies conduct largemarketing and nationwide testing in a
manner that more nearly resembles the operations of a tradi-
tional medical device manufacturer than that of the traditional
hospital or independent laboratory. These changes have
occurred in a highly politicized environment in which such
LDT companies and traditional medical device manufacturers
see government action as a method by which competition can
be limited and market share expanded or contracted. If sig-
niﬁcant numbers of misleading results are reported to either
clinicians or consumers, there is an economic harm that can
contribute to adverse health outcomes even in the absence of
physical harm. This potential harm should be considered when
determining whether the costs imposed by regulatory activities
are appropriate to the burden of these activities.
Failures in Spite of Oversight
It is equally important, however, to consider the question of
whether the approach proposed by the FDA will improve
public health. Evidence is limited that current LDT imple-
mentation results in adverse public health consequences.
Although FDA regulation of laboratory devices overall
almost certainly has resulted in public health beneﬁt, there
are some notable exceptions.
For example, there is little doubt that prostate-speciﬁc
antigen (PSA) quantitation provides a reasonable screen for
prostate cancer. However, clinical trials and epidemiological
evidence12 accumulated in the United States suggest that early
detection of prostatic cancer, the intended use for which PSA
tests are legally marketed, does not confer a signiﬁcant survival
beneﬁt for most individuals, although long-term outcomes from
a European trial reach the opposite conclusion.13 Since treat-
ment of early prostate cancer seems to offer no advantage over
watchful waiting14e17 but does carry signiﬁcant morbidity, a
reasonable case can be made that the process by which PSA
was approved represents a public health failure that resulted
from a combination of the legal framework within which the
FDA is required to perform review, as well as a misunder-
standing of prostate cancer biology on the part of FDA
personnel and themedical community alike. TheUSPreventive
Services Task Force thus now strongly recommends against use
of PSA for prostate cancer screening, regardless of age (http://
www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/prostatecancerscreen
ing.htm, last accessed September 26, 2014). Similarly, althoughjmd.amjpathol.org - The Journal of Molecular Diagnostics
EditorialFDA approved PCA3 testing for deciding when repeat prostate
biopsies are indicated (http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_
docs/pdf10/P100033a.pdf, last accessed September 26, 2014),
a report by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
suggests that the quality of evidence supporting the use of this
test is low, as is its apparent diagnostic efﬁcacy.18 Evidence to
support its use in improving health outcomes, such as disease-
free survival, is lacking.
This example raises uncertainty about the FDA’s apparent
belief that its regulatory approach, when applied to LDTs,
will result in a superior public health outcome. “Clinical
validity” of a laboratory test does not assure that that its use
will improve public health.
Where Do We Go from Here?
How then should the government respond to legitimate con-
cerns over the accuracy of LDTs, evidence of probable eco-
nomic harm, or concerns about public heath harm? To its
credit, the FDA seems to have taken a measured approach and
does not intend to disrupt the use of LDTs in traditional patient
care settings and where required to achieve good medical
outcomes. However, evidence of a signiﬁcant public health
issue that requires attention is not empirically supported.
Reporting of adverse events, though somewhat helpful in un-
derstanding negativeoutcomes, does not allow true assessment
of the risk-beneﬁt ratio for regulation because outcome
assessment is seldom conducted by disinterested observers.
Further, premarket approval or clearance does not ensure that
laboratory tests have a positive public health impact, though
such a process is likely to keep truly harmful tests off the
market. However, to suggest that the proposed FDA actions
will seriously curb innovation is wildly speculative.
Unfortunately, CLIA alone, as currently implemented,
may well be inadequate. There are no strong standards in
CLIA for validating LDTs, and there is no centralized
reporting mechanism by which the public can become aware
of either the magnitude of LDT testing, the beneﬁt derived
from this testing, or adverse consequences associated with
this testing. Validation and performance data for most LDTs
are not available for public inspection, and I believe it is
likely inadequate in many laboratories. In some cases, com-
plex algorithms for creating test results are used, and even
if these algorithms are made available to inspectors, inde-
pendent validation is, practically speaking, impossible. As
currently used, CLIA does not guarantee the elimination of
unsafe tests. However, CLIA regulations can be changed and
could beneﬁt from consideration of the generally disciplined
approach with which FDA evaluates in vitro diagnostic
devices.19
Although some individuals have suggested that the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services does not have the
authority under CLIA to assess clinical validity and utility of
LDTs, 42 U.S.C. 263a1 gives the US Secretary of Health and
Human Services the authority to include in accreditation
standards such factors that the Secretary considers relevant.The Journal of Molecular Diagnostics - jmd.amjpathol.orgOversight by two separate regulatory agencies, when there is
a lawful basis for sufﬁcient oversight by one, does not appear
to impose the “least burden on society,” although it probably
represents the least burden to the individual regulatory
agencies. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
the FDA, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices should work together with the professional community
to devise a single coherent regulatory approach that mini-
mizes burden on the clinical laboratory while assuring
transparency of laboratory operation and providing a means
to identify the beneﬁts and risks of LDTs. Such an effort
should include the development of strong, and to the extent
possible, uniform standards for validating LDTs and should
employ sound statistical reasoning; such an effort might well
require groups of laboratories to work together to validate
LDTs which would then be adopted by all laboratories within
the group. This approach should allow for rapid imple-
mentation of new LDTs so that innovation is not impeded by
sometimes lengthy and expensive FDA premarket review
processes and it should be performed under the auspices of a
single ofﬁce, rather than by several regulatory agencies
operating independently. Such an approach would increase
public conﬁdence in LDT strategies and increase conﬁdence
in government by assuring that government agencies with
overlapping responsibilities work together to create the least
burdensome strategy for government oversight, as required
by the President’s executive order.
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